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PROBLEMS OF ADVOCACY*
Robert J. S. Ross
Department of Sociology, Clark University

ABSTRACT
The recent past has seen the erosion, and among some, the rejection,
of social science neutrality and professional detachment. Among the
typical expressions of a new professionalism is the underdog advocate,
who wishes to lend his or her skills to the cause of less-than-equal
groups in the society. The paper analyzes the problems confronting
such advocates. The first is the discrepancy between career routes
and success behavior on one hand, and the needs of poor people on the
other. The second is the difficulty encountered by middle strata professionals in cross-class and cross-cultural communication, including
their own ignorance of the structure and dynamics of minority and poor
peoples' communities. The third problem faced by the advocates is
that the mere addition of their expert skills to the struggles of the
deprived is not necessarily or usually adequate in terms of power
resources. If advocates have, however, a modest definition of their
possible accomplishment, and if they view underprivileged groups as
the main actors in their own behalf, their roles may be defined more
realistically.

Introduction
The last fifteen years have witnessed an erosion in the two related
models of social science neutrality and professional detachment and
self-regulation. In the case of social science neutrality the erosion
has been dual: first, the possibility of "value-free" cultural work
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-246-

has been challenged, and among many, rejected (Gouldner, 1962; Stein,
1968; Hoult, 1968; also see Lynd, 1939); second, the desirability of
allegedly "uncommitted" work has been questioned and charged with
being covert or unconscious commitment to status quo values and
arrangements (e.g. Gouldner, 1970; Mills, 1967).
The breakdown of the social science consensus on detachment and "valuefree" work is not surprising. The advanced capitalist societies of the
West, especially in North America, have had, and are still experiencing,
a period of intense social conflict over race, poverty, war, liberty,
and morals. Since detachment and objectivity must rest on consensus
among scholars as to what is "given" and what is problemmatic, and on
a sense of common membership in a scientific community (Bendix, 1970),
Weber's classic statement (Weber, 1919, 1946) seems, today, beside the
point.
Conflict and division in society has produced parallel division among
members of (antagonistic) scientific subcommunities. Weber lectured
against propaganda from the podium. His latter day critics, taking
their cue from Mannheim (1949), argue that selecting the "facts" is the
first step toward inevitable, even if unrecognized commitment.
Parallel to the erosion of the model of value-free social science has
been new analyses of professionalism in all of the human service fields.
(cf. Haug and Sussman, 1970) Here too the attack has been, basically
dual. First, the idea of the professional, self-regulating community
(Goode, 1957) as one which would necessarily serve clients best has
been brought under attack by those who observe that self-regulation, as
in medicine, quite frequently serves self-interest and in turn is sometimes or even frequently in opposition to client interest.
(e.g.
Alford, 1974; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971)
The second aspect of
the attack on conventional professionalism has focussed on the professional's alleged ability to know the interests of the client more
adequately than the client does him or herself.
Criticism of professionalism, like criticism of social science neutrality, is not surprising when newly organized interests, represented by
combative and suspicious entrants to policy disputes, challenge a
system of authority. As Hughes pointed out (1958, 1960), professionalism entails a mandate from society and from clients; this mandate
grants to the self-regulating profession a monopoly of authority over
matters concerning its area of competence. "Perhaps it is well to
recall," writes Hughes,
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that the opposite of service is disservice and, that
the line between them is thin, obscure and shifting.
In many of the things which people do for one another,
the for can be changed to to by a slight over-doing
or by a shift of mood.
(Hughes, 1958: 69)
From the mid-sixties, black communities began to generate spokespersons who resisted the imposition of white elites' views about community development. It was inevitable that city planners, and other
social service professionals would come under fire
as persons without
knowledge of or sympathy with the needs of the Black poor--that is,
without a legitimated mandate.
The response made to these criticisms by many professionals has been a
new ethic of professionalism. (Dumont, 1970) In part, the new professionalism has interpreted its
responsibility as speaking out for
and joining the underdog.
One city planner in Chicago, for example, working for the Department
of Urban Renewal, publicly wrote an attack on design features and the
lack of low-income housing in a Southside clearance project. He was
fired; he obtained financial support from a liberal Chicago organization
of rabbis and went to work for a community organization in the black
residential area he had discussed. Another planner, interviewed in my
study of advocate planners (Ross, 1975, 1976) opposed the location of a
highway in a Chicano community near San Diego.
Fired by the city
agency for his opposition, he was hired by the Model Cities area board
as their consultant on planning issues.
In the context of the late Sixties, an underdog advocacy like this
frequently called for conflict with the established city-wide agencies.
In such a conflict the planner, in much the same sense as the lawyer,
was an advocate for his clients' interest.
In this sense, the advocate
planner, or the doctor who attacked a city's slowness in performing
lead paint inspections, represents a redefinition of the service ethic
of professionalism. When the tumult of the last decades broke up the
consensus view of the "comon good," many activist professionals,
especially those affected by public policy, looked to an identifiable
client for their mandate.
The definition of who the client is when one works "for the community"
as many claimed to, is not, to be sure, an easy task. A voluntary
organization claiming to represent "the community" may or may not
express views endorsed by most residents. And it will be ones' implicit
or explicit political outlook which dictates one's estimate of whether
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an organization's substantive position stands for the "interests" of
the community as a whole, or any segment it claims to represent. But
even with its difficulties, defining the client as a community group
or specific neighborhood is a step toward commitment to previously
neglected interests. The political commitment frequently embodied in
this definition made the "new professionals" appear to some of their
colleagues, as "unprofessional." The rhetoric of conflict in the
inner city of the latter Sixties was not particularly polite, and
indeed, demonstrations and other actions frequently had as much symbolic contention as coherent programs. Nevertheless, for many of the
advocates in planning and other professions, this thrust to direct
responsibility to an underprivileged or mistreated client had many
overtones of a renewal of the service ethic which historically defines
professionalism. The context of egalitarianism and populist ideas
constrained this new version of the service ethic in ways shaped by a
perception of the alleged distortions of orthodox professionalism.
For the new professionals in policy related fields, service to a suspect version of the "common good" was superceded by service to those
heretofore excluded from potent roles in policy-making. For those in
the free professions, service to the poor or working class was valued
over that to the rich or affluent.
The norms of objectivity and detachment which were supposed to protect
clients from hasty or personally distorted judgment were rejected.
They implied, for these activists, a status inequality, a haughty
removal from the peoples' struggles.
In the place of the protection of
detachment, however, there appeared the concomitant willingness to be
criticized, to listen to the client, to be humble in the exercise of
judgment.
(Ultimately, of course, responsibility for technical judgment could not be evaded, and the more life threatening a potential
error was, the less such views penetrated the profession in question.)
In place of the "hard" results which planners, architects, doctors had
come to expect - projects completed, buildings designed, patients cured
- new goals arose: leadership developed which could carry on without
constant technical support; buildings and projects designed perhaps
more slowly, but with the approval of its users; communities not free
of disease perhaps, but a bit less in awe of and less reluctant to use
modern medicine. These are some of the ways the climate created by the
protests of the recent past impacted on the human service professions.
So, in both social science and social service a new sense of commitment
has suffused the work of many practitioners. But despite the renewal of
a service ethic, it is not clear how, in the context of research for
example a partisan social science (or scientist) can remain open to
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disconfirming or uncomfortable facts; nor are many radical or commited social scientists content with a resolution of the problem of
objectivity which concludes that reality is necessarily or wholly
dependent on the position or preference of a given observer.
Similarly, there are obscure and technical aspects of many professional
fields of which lay persons remain mystified, and cannot judge; and
there are, one can imagine, instances in which a professional may indeed know what is in a client's interest more clearly than the client.
Therefore, although this paper focusses on problems involved in
adopting the newer modes of social science and professionalism, it is
not written without recognition of the complexities which precede them.
It is clear, however, that many recent entrants to these fields have
made value commitments in their professionalism or their science.
While their work is not value-free, neither is it problem-free. So we
address here some of those problems.
Specifically, after examining
the analysis held in common by many professionals recently, this paper
focusses on problems of career routes and respectability for advocates;
on their attempts at cross-class and cross-cultural communication; and
on the fact that they are faced with power located far from their
grasp.
Advocacy
As we have seen, for some scientists and professionals the socially
determined focus of suffering, inequality, and injustice leads them to
define, or want to define, their work in such a manner so as to advance
the interests of these oppressed groups. Summarized most briefly,
their analysis is that the privileged classes in modern society are
well-served by the ordinary functioning of scholarship and social and
health service; indeed, the analysis claims that such intellectual and
professional work usually, and certainly in the long run, functions so
as to more deeply entrench what is judged to be unjustified privilege
and unconscionable oppression. This charge implies that scientific and
professional workers, that is, intellectuals, have a large role in the
maintenance of a given social order. As one leftist planner put it,
planners are the "soft-cops" of the city. (Goodman, 1971:13)
As new entrants to the professions and to social science were developing
this practical critique of their own fields, at the same time there
appeared renewed interest in the concept of "hegemony" as suggested by
the Italian Communist, Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, "the intellectual
and moral leadership" exercised by a ruling group, and "the general
direction imposed upon social life by the dominant fundamental group"
is constituted in part by hegemony in intellectual life. This, in turn,
produces consent to a given order's principles of organization, (i.e.
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appropriation); this consent relieves a ruling class of the dangerous
necessity of imposing its will by force.
(Gramsci, 1971: 12)
Thus,
the critique developed by the new activists is a political, or politicized perspective, one which implicitly accepts a view of the society
as stratified and conflict-laden around that stratification. Therefore
an adversary process of social action and decision-making is appropriate; and so, the idea of advocacy--in social science and service--has
become current. The advocate, at the minimum, declares a commitment
to serve the interests of his or her client; he or she may further
submit to the direction of the client; and the advocate may also serve
at the discretion of the client.
The commitment among these new professionals to the redress of inequity
and the subordination of these professionals to the unequal occurs in
relation to specific social and historical trends.
Increases in disposable income, among other things, breeds among some a sense of the
irrationality, the lack of material necessity for suffering. Consequently, it breeds guilt among the comfortable, who, since they see
suffering which is not objectively or materially necessary, tell themselves, in the words of Phil Och's song, "There but for fortune go you
and I."
Discussion of youth movements of the Sixties have emphasized
this latter aspect of social movement participation as guilt. (e.g.
Keniston, 1968) But, though this may be true--indeed we think it is-the critical aspect of advocacy is its proponents' focus--explicity or
implicity--on the irrationality of the social arrangements which create
or maintain suffering. This focus leads naturally enough to the notion
that the exercise of expertise and rationality in the interests of the
unequal will be a major element in the melioration of their condition.
One planner interviewed in my study of advocates in city planning, for
example, had worked with troubled blacks and their parents, helping them
redesign a condemned school building. This planner's view of advocacy
was:
The facilitation of the achievement of community goals
by an expert, especially the goals of community groups
who lack the knowledgeability or power to achieve those
goals.
(Interview #28; unpublished data from Ross, 1975)
Armed with what is after all a certain optimism, then, advocates in
social science and the professions attempt to use their expertise in the
interests of the oppressed.

In 1968 1 observed the beginning of an advocacy planning project in
Chicago's West Side ghetto; earlier I had been involved in something
called the Center for Radical Research in Chicago; and then I did
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research on advocacy in city planning. From these experiences as
observer-researcher, and as a participant I want to comment on three
problems faced by advocates:
there are the problems of career and
profession, the problem of cross-cultural and cross-class communication, and the problem of power.
Career and Profession
For those in the so-called helping professions the primary problem involved in advocacy is, I would imagine, the structure of one's institutional employer, and the distribution of the services it produces.
But for social scientists and planners--the groups with whom I have had
contact--a rather different order of problem arises. Central here is
the fundamental fact that these professionals are now part of more or
less clearly defined career ladders, and these ladders are more or less
sharply distinct from advocacy concerns.
For the social scientist-either as graduate student or young untenured member of a faculty-relatively heavy expectations exist for professional output and
achieved competency. Taking on the professional identity brings these
expectations.
The management of career goals generally requires a
great deal of one's finite time and energy. This becomes a problem
for advocates because meeting the needs of underprivileged groups is
not necessarily or even usually the kind of activity which can easily
be used to meet other career commitments. In short, you get few points
for service.
I can illustrate this with some examples from my Chciago experience.
The Center for Radical Research was formed on the model of a summer
project, in 1966, in which about fifty students would do research helpful to black and poor white community organizations involved in resistance to urban renewal and other projects in the city. The communication link between the organizations and the students involved delicate
political tasks as this was the period of the rise of a nationalist tone
in black community life. Supposedly, the community groups would define
research needs, and groups of students led by graduate students or
teachers would try to help serve them. The task of leading these groups
was a tremendous potential time burden. In my own case, that summer was
to have been one of work on a Master's paper. What I discovered was
that the kind of work required by graduate training was not going to be
fulfilled through work on these community needs. For example, in one
area a nascent tenants' group needed information as to who the large
slumlords were. This information was useful to them, but not part of
the kind of work which I could easily or immediately convert to academic
or professional credit. Another group wanted to know about Mafia
involvement in their neighborhood. Given the time and resources
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available extensive use of clipping files was the best we could do:
but people in the community knew at least as much as we could find that
way. In sum, the Center was a good experience for a group of students
who were exposed to the city, an awesome drain on the energies of the
so-called group leaders, and of very limited value to the communities.
In my own dissertation research a similar problem occurred. I was involved in a survey of advocate planners. Because my institute was
quantitatively oriented; because the pressure on dissertations are for
scientifi6 rigor; because such studies are easier to fund than others
this mode was used. Yet as we interviewed advocates, their need
emerged as one for detailed contextual case studies: how to do it, how
others have done it. At a general level I hope our work was helpful,
but it is clear that many specific advocate's needs were not met by
our conventionally defined work.
The point, then, is clear. For a number of potential advocates--especially in research oriented fields--the orthodox professional careersmake
demands which cannot be met with this work. To break with orthodoxy,
to accept insecurity and disapproval, are key elements in one's ability
to do successful work. And indeed, this is what we discover: the most
effective advocate researchers are those guerrilla researchers not now
involved with academia. The North American Congress on Latin America
(NACLA), the Africa Research Group (ARG), the Radical Education Project
(REP--an arm of the now defunct Students for a Democratic Society) and
the Brains Mistrust (BMT--a local group at the University of Michigan in
1970-72) are examples of this route.
One should point out, however, before leaving this topic, that as a certain number of sympathetic professionals begin to appear in a given
field, critical mass can be reached: enough people to provide support,
guidance, and employment can create sufficient social space to allow
people to take this route. I believe this has begun to occur in economics and sociology and psychology, but it is only a beginning.
Cross-cultural Communication:
The second broad area of problems an advocate faces is that of crossclass and cross-cultural communication. In our study of community planning about half the advocate planners indicated that class, race or cultural gaps between themselves and their clients create serious problems
of trust and communication. This problem is not, of course, unique to
activist advocates. Gans' famous (1965) analysis of urban renewal in an
Italian community in Boston, for example, showed the rather large discrepancy between the cultural and aesthetic standards of the upper middle
class sub-culture of the planners and the working class residents of the
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West End. The planners saw poor and overcrowded housing; the residents
experienced minor inconvenience (e.g. cold water), but enjoyed low rent
and a genuine sense of communal belonging. The planners saw crime statistics, but these were generated in just one part of the area, the old
Scollay Square, and this area was excluded, by residents, from their
social perception of the community boundaries.
The planners, with
speculators in support, razed the area, causing grief (Fried, 1963)
which would have been surprising if the area really had been so bad.
Among the advocates, those who do not see this relationship as creating
problems are much more likely to be members of minority groups themselves--that is, Chicano or Black.
Advocate planners indicate that they use different strategies to
attempt to overcome class or cultural barriers to communication. One
white planner, part of a firm, hired a black project director; another
non-Spanish speaking planner who worked with a Chicano community said
he carefully cultivated personal relationships with the community organization's leadership. The general theme of advocates' coping strategies though, is dual:
on the one hand, many emphasize listening carefully and patiently to community members' grievances, criticism, etc.;
on the other hand, a number of planners emphasize the requirement of
steady commitment and accomplishment. They point out that people trust
you when they see you working for them through long periods of adversity.
As one goes over these interviews, though, the gap between the role of
the educated professional and the lay community resident is of a kind
not so easily solved. Good will and hard work, our respondents seem to
be saying, will carry the outsider through these difficulties. My
observational experience in Chicago, however, argues for the need for a
different approach in addition.
In the Chicago community I observed, initial open community meetings
were called by the middle class educated leadership of the community.
Acting as a steering committee of a newly formed federation, they had
selected a planning firm to help propose alternatives to the official
proposals which would have entailed large scale dislocation. They held
community meetings for the planners to explain their work and listen to
the community. Throughout the first four or five of these sessions one
could notice an interesting dynamic. The questions and arguments from
the floor, directed to the planners who were sharing a stage-front table
with the steering committee, frequently appeared to assume that the
planners' tentative proposals were already the city's policies.
Thus,
the residents attacked or defended as if the planners' ideas were the
law. The notion that the planners had been hired by the community to
serve it had not taken root among the residents. Moreover, the
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discussion revealed that the residents did not distinguish between a
proposal which might or might not get implemented, and an actual operating program. Briefly put, though nominally members of an organization
which had hired advocate planners, the residents did not know what the
planning process involved. Furthermore, they responded to the advocates
with much the same attitude as they would have to the city's own employees. A clear need in this situation was an introductory session or
series which walked people through the nature of the policy-making process on which they were embarked. As things turned out, the broadness
of participation was not maintained, and the organization's functions
gradually devolved upon its leadership.
Besides concluding that participation requires that people be given effective tools of participation--in this case, some knowledge of what a
planner's job might be--there are other things to learn from that community's experience.
White and black professionals are both apt to forget that minority
ethnic communities, though disproportionately low income, are also diverse. Involuntary segregation, and a dual housing market, separate for
blacks and whites (Molotch, 1972) produces, especially in many older
black communities in inner city areas, significant class and educational
diversity among residents. Thus, an understanding reached with a community's leadership, which is apt to represent the most stable and professionally sophisticated stratum of the community, will not necessarily
reach down to the poorer or less educated strata of the community. In
the Chicago case this fact almost led to a strategic disaster.
At one point in the proceeding the planners mentioned the need for code
enforcement in the largely apartment-house community. Now the economics
of ghetto real estate are such that the owner of a small building without other significant holdings can rarely afford the investment required
for preventive maintenance or rehabilitation (Beckman, 1972); and financing is hard to get. Large real estate firms with good cash positions
can generally afford this. At the meeting that night there was an owner
of a single slum apartment dwelling--a black resident--who began to
attack the idea of code enforcement. As a small owner his plight was
understandable; his rhetoric, however, was not about the economic squeeze,
but about the evils of invasion by white inspectors.
It was passionately
nationalist in tone. For a while it appeared that opposition to code enforcement would be mobilized by this nationalist spirit. Eventually,
however, the vast majority's interest--as tenants who wanted decent
facilities--prevailed. This was a modest-sized class-conflict, and the
existence of such differences within minority communities cannot be
ignored.
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Power
An overarching problem advocates face is that of developing sufficient
power to make a difference. For research professionals this may be
less pressing, for usually they are in a more auxilliary service role,
not on the cutting edge of action. The symptom of the problem, for
advocate researchers, is a tendency to be utopian, or to compensate by
a naive kind of muck-raking. In this mode, the researcher expresses
indignation when he or she discovers, for example, an entrepreneur profitted by his or her schemes. For the planners, though, the problem is
significant--even, one might add, when they are not explicitly conscious of it. It seems fair to say that most advocates hope that the
addition of their skills to a community's development process will help
it in its struggle for constructive change. But the fact of the matter
is that the mobilization of an urban community or neighborhood is but
one step in a long chain of changes, actions, and strategies which
might substantially alter the conditions of life of poor and minority
peoples. To give just the flavor of this issue, consider the position
taken by Leon Keyserling who has argued that if a full employment
strategy had been followed in the Sixties, regardless of, or even instead of, the War on Poverty, poverty and associated problems of urban
life would have been more significantly alleviated (Keyserling, 1969)
than it was.
One of the earliest of the advocate planners, Robert Goodman has put it
this way:
...within the present economic structure of our society,
simply giving the poor more access to planning expertise
doesn't basically change their chances of getting the
same goods and services as wealther citizens.
...Pluralist opportunities are therefore a necessary, but
hardly sufficient, condition for real society equality.
For such equality to occur, pluralism must be tied to a
political ideology which deals directly with the means of
equally distributing economic power. (Goodman, 1971:175)
These views have two implications for advocates, and are fitting places
to close. First, to be maximally effective, local advocacy must look
to national levels of resource allocation. The reason is simply that
the resources available for physical reconstruction of a poor neighborhood, or for significantly increasing employment opportunities or needed
services will not be generated in that neighborhood; and given the present structure of state and local vs. federal taxation (Pettengell and
Uppal, 1974; O'Connor, 1973), they probably cannot be generated from
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municipal budgets. So neighborhood organization aimed solely at redress of grievances at the city wide level is apt to be most effective
in defensive struggles. The planners I studied in the early Seventies
were clear about this:
they reported that they were more effective
when stopping "bad" things--e.g., a highway which would raze an area-than in their attempts to gain constructive long-range improvements.
This implies, in conventional jargon, the need for aggregation, across
many neighborhoods and cities, of the demands of community level advocates, including practitioners and researchers and their resident coworkers.
In the late Sixties, for example, the National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO) was able to combine militant local action for
changes and increases in Welfare allowances with a national presence
calling for federally guaranteed minimum incomes. Its activity, imperfect perhaps, finally succumbed to the same dynamic which scattered the
protests of the late Sixties. But the example remains a provocative one.
The links between local grievances and national demands for resources
implies, at least, a para-political party-like process of organization.
In such an effort, citizens are mobilized for action in their own interest at all levels of government. Their action is, itself, the strategic centerpiece of the effort.
So, the second implication is that the professional advocate performs
an auxiliary service for the effort of community and national mobilization. Though an honorable task, worth doing, it is probably an overstatement to conceive of such service as essential to attaining progress
for the less than equal. If the advocate role is seen in these relatively modest terms, relieved of the burden of seeing itself as the only
or best hope for the poor, more realistic community strategies can be
generated, and more realistic personal coping strategies may be adopted
by the advocates themselves.
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